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Note from the Field
The Complementary and Conflicting
Relationship Between the Special Court for
Sierra Leone and the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission
Abdul Tejan-Colet
Most countries in transition from civil war face limited choices when
imposing accountability for past atrocities. Some, like Mozambique, opt
to grant unconditional amnesty. Other countries, like South Africa, have
instituted a truth and reconciliation commission and granted limited
amnesty, while yet others, like Rwanda, prosecute perpetrators of
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. These solutions are
not mutually exclusive. Following a ten-year, bloody war characterized
by widespread killings, amputations, rape, slavery, enforced prostitution
and extensive use of child soldiers, Sierra Leone has chosen a unique
blend of institutional mechanisms. At first, the government purported to
grant an "unconditional" amnesty to the perpetrators while establishing
a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. When the agreement
establishing the latter foundered, the government established a Special
Court in addition to the Commission. Amnesty pardons all, the
Commission seeks truth, reconciliation and healing for past wrongs, and
the Court aims at prosecuting the most culpable perpetrators. This Note
examines two of these seemingly conflicting mechanisms - the Truth and
t Law Lecturer, Fourah Bay College, University of Sierra Leone, Yale World Fellow 2002.
The views expressed herein are only those of the author in his personal capacity and do not
necessarily represent those of any organization he works for or represents.
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Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court. The Note compares
the mandates of the respective bodies, as well as their basis, composition
and jurisdiction and discusses their respective roles in Sierra Leone. The
Note highlights several areas in which these bodies need to cooperate
while maintaining their independence and emphasizes the need to define
the relationship between the two institutions in order to preserve their
effectiveness.
I. INTRODUCTION
Societies emerging from political turmoil and civil unrest associated
with gross violations of human rights and humanitarian law face the
crucial questions of how to deal with these atrocities and how to come to
terms with the past.1 Since the 1980s, this problem has been a major pre-
occupation of international law and scholarship. The traditional responses
include international intervention pursuant to Chapter VII powers of the
United Nations Charter, grants of conditional amnesty to perpetrators of
war crimes and crimes against humanity, grants of some form of
unconditional amnesty, and prosecution of those responsible.
Nowhere is the difficulty of dealing with the past more pressing than
in Sierra Leone, which recently emerged from a ten-year civil war
characterized by systematic, serious, and widespread violations of human
rights and international humanitarian law. 2 The government of Sierra
Leone needed to make a choice among these four traditional strategies for
dealing with pervasive human rights violations. Many discussions on post-
conflict accountability mechanisms weigh the merits in choosing among a
truth commission, national or international criminal prosecutions, or some
other form of establishing accountability. Sierra Leone is unique in trying
1. Steven R. Ratner, New Democracies, Old Atrocities: An Inquiry in International Law, 87
GEO. L.J. 707 (1999); see also STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 140-41
(2001); Jose Zalaquett, Confronting Human Rights Violations Committed by Former Governments:
Principles Applicable and Political Constraints, in STATE CRIMES: PUNISHMENT OR PARDON 23, 41-
43 (1989); J. Sarkin, The Necessity and Challenges of Establishing a Truth and Reconciliation
Commission in Rwanda, 29 HUM. RTS. Q. 767, 768-70 (1999); Dr. Kristin Henrard, The Viability Of
National Amnesties in View of the Increasing Recognition Of Individual Criminal Responsibility at
International Law, 8 MSU-DCL J. INT'L L. 595 (1999). See also Luc Huyse, Transitional Justice, in
DEMOCRACY AND DEEP-ROOTED CONFLICT: OPTIONS FOR NEGOTIATORS 273, 275 (Peter Harris &
Ben Reilly eds., 1998); Jaime Malamud-Goti, Transitional Governments in the Breach: Why Punish
State Criminals, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH
FORMER REGIMES 189, 206 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995); Carlos S. Nino, Response: The Duty to Punish
Past Abuses of Human Rights Put into Context: The Case of Argentina, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE:
How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES 417, 418-419 (Neil. J. Kritz ed.,
1995).
2. For a detailed account of the atrocities in Sierra Leone, see Abdul Tejan-Cole, Human
Rights under the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) in Sierra Leone: A Catalogue of Abuse,
10 AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 481 (1998). See generally Human Rights Watch at
http://www.hrw.org and Amnesty International at http://www.amnesty.org, particularly
the country and special reports on Sierra leone from 1991 to date.
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almost all of these options in attempting to address its post-conflict
situation.
In Sierra Leone, both rebel and government forces committed atrocities
in the period after the conflict began in March 1991. Members of the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF),3 with the military and material support
of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL),4 quickly gained control
over a fifth of the territory of Sierra Leone and engaged in a campaign of
violence whose only motivating factor seems to have been the control of
Sierra Leone's abundant diamond wealth. In a counter-offensive, the army
hastily conscripted hundreds of recruits, the enlistment rising from 3,000 to
14,000 men in the first two years of the conflict. Most of the new
government recruits were disaffected-the army was mismanaged and
underpaid. In April 1992, a group of soldiers arrived in Freetown from the
war front to demand better pay and conditions. They soon overthrew
President Momoh's Government in a coup. The coup was extremely
popular, particularly because social conditions had rapidly deteriorated,
labor and student unrest had heightened, and elections had approached,
which the opposition parties alleged the government was preparing to rig.
Over the next four years, the RUF continued to fight to overthrow the
successive governments. Elected president in 1996, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah
was overthrown in a May 1997 coup by the Armed Forces Revolutionary
Council (AFRC),5 a group created by a cadre of senior military officers. The
AFRC then supported Johnny Paul Koroma, who initiated an alliance with
the RUF. During the period of RUF/AFRC rule, the rule of law and the
economic situation in the country completely deteriorated. In February
1998, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG), which had been defending the Freetown airport, drove the
RUF/AFRC out of Freetown and restored Kabbah to office. Foday Sankoh,
leader of the RUF, returned to Sierra Leone after being arrested in Nigeria
and was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death for treason. By the end of
1998, however, the rebels had gained control over half the country,
particularly in the major diamond mining areas.
In January 1999, the AFRC/RUF entered Freetown and commenced
"Operation No Living Thing." The subsequent human rights violations
were among the worst of the conflict. After several weeks, ECOMOG was
able to push the AFRC/RUF out of Freetown, but many children were
abducted in the RUF retreat, and the RUF continued to control much of the
country. Many Sierra Leoneans were displaced as a result of the RUF's
occupation.
3. The RUF is a loosely organized guerrilla group that started the'war in 1991, seeking to
topple the government of Sierra Leone and to retain control of the lucrative diamond-
producing regions of the country. It was headed by a former Corporal in the Sierra Leone
Army, Foday Sankoh.
4. Led by Charles Taylor, president of Liberia, the NPFL launched a civil war in
neighboring Liberia in 1989.
5. The Council formed by Johnny Paul Koroma after May 25, 1999.
2003]
3
Tejan-Cole: The Complementary and Conflicting Relationship Between the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2003
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
In May 1999, under the auspices of ECOWAS, 6 a cease-fire agreement
was signed. Sankoh was released from prison in July in order to attend
negotiations with Kabbah in Lom6, Togo. On July 7, the Lom6 Accord was
signed. 7 To general dismay, Sankoh was appointed Chairman of the Board
of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National
Reconstruction and Development- giving him control of the diamond
mines-and also vice-president of Sierra Leone, making him answerable
only to the President.
The Lom6 Accord provided for the creation of a Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to aid in reconciling the various factions
and to provide a forum for victims and combatants to tell their stories, with
a hope toward beginning a healing process for all Sierra Leoneans. The
Accord also provided, however, a complete and unconditional blanket
amnesty to all combatants for activities occurring after 1991. The U.N.
made it explicit that the amnesty and pardon provisions would not apply
to crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed during the
conflict.
8
In October 1999, the Security Council established the United Nation's
Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to assist in carrying out the Lom6
Accord. Although disarmament began and peacekeeping troops were
present in Sierra Leone, the peace was tenuous. Despite the signing of the
Lome Agreement, hostilities did not cease, and the factions continued to
commit atrocities. 9 In May 2000, the government of Sierra Leone reassessed
its stance toward a full amnesty after the rebels took United Nations
peacekeepers as hostages 10 and Sankoh's security guards killed several
people during a demonstration by civil society groups in front of his
residence."
6. Economic Community of West African States.
7. Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary
United Front of Sierra Leone, July 7, 1999 [hereinafter Lome Accord], available at
http://www.sierra-leone.org/Lom6accord.html.
8. Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary
United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL) November 30, 1996, available at http://www.sierra-
leone.org/abidjanaccord.html.
9. For a detailed account, see Abdul Tejan-Cole, The Special Court for Sierra Leone:
Conceptual Concerns and Alternatives, 1 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 107 (2001); see also HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, Sierra Leone: Getting Away With Murder, Mutilation, Rape-New testimony from Sierra
Leone, in WORLD REPORT 1999 (July 1999), available at http://www.hrw.org/
hrw/reports/1999/sierra.
10. Christopher S. Wren, U.N. Says Leone Rebels Now Hold 92 Peacekeepers, N.Y. TIMES,
May 5, 2000, at A14; James Rupert and Douglas Farah, Liberian Leader Urges Sierra Leone Rebels
to Free Hostages, WASH. POST, May 20, 2000, at A20; see also SIERRA LEONE WEB NEWS ARCHIVES,
May 5, 2000, available at http://sierra-leone.org/slnews05OO.html.
11. Norimitsu Onishi, Gunmen Fire on Protesters in Sierra Leone, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2000, at
A6. The Sierra Leone Web cited Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders) estimate
of approximately 40 civilian casualties. SIERRA LEONE WEB NEWS ARCHIVES, May 10, 2000,
available at http: /sierra-leone.org/slnewsO500-B.html.
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The Special Court for Sierra Leone and the TRC
President Kabbah wrote to the U.N. Secretary-General requesting the
establishment of an independent Special Court for Sierra Leone to address
the violations committed during the war. In August, the Security Council
passed Resolution 1315 mandating the Secretary-General to negotiate an
agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone to create an independent
Special Court.12 On October 4, 2000 the Secretary-General submitted his
report to the Security Council, annexing the draft agreement between the
U.N. and the government of Sierra Leone and the draft statute for the
establishment of the court.13 Several letters between the president of the
Security Council and the Secretary-General from December 2000 to July
2001 made revisions to the Statute.
14
In July 2001 the Security Council approved plans for a court that would
prosecute "persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious
violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law
committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996." The
Security Council endorsed the establishment of a special tribunal and on
January 16, 2002, Hans Correll' 5 for the United Nations and Solomon
Ekuma Berewa 16 for the government of Sierra Leone signed the agreement
establishing the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
Consequently, Sierra Leone will have both a national TRC and an
international, U.N.-sanctioned Special Court. This situation is unique as it
is the first time a court and a truth commission with related jurisdiction
have been established with the assistance of the United Nations. The
institutions will operate contemporaneously with concurrent and
somewhat overlapping jurisdiction.
12. S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 4168th mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/1315 (2000) [hereinafter
Security Council Resolution 1315], available at http://ods-dds-nv.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
GEN/NOO/605/32/PDF/N0060532.pdf?OpenElement.
13. Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra
Leone, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (2000) [hereinafter Special Court
Statute], available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/specialcourtstatute.html.
14. Letter from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General,
U.N. Doc. S/2000/1234 (December 22, 2000) [hereinafter December 22, 2000 Security Council
Letter], available at http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NOO/812/77/PDF/
N0081277.pdf?OpenElement; Letter from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of
the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/40 (January 12, 2001) [hereinafter, January 12, 2001 S-
G Letter], available at http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/211/71/
PDF/N0121171.pdf?OpenElement; and Letter from the Secretary-General addressed to the
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/693 (July 12, 2001) [hereinafter July 12,
2001 S-G Letter], available at http:/ /ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/455/50/
PDF/N0145550.pdf?OpenElement.
15. U.N. Deputy Under-Secretary for Legal Matters.
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II. BASIS, COMPOSITION, AND JURISDICTION OF THE COMMISSION AND THE
SPECIAL COURT
A. Legal Basis
The Special Court for Sierra Leone will function under a unique
mandate. Unlike the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY),
the Special Court for Sierra Leone was established by an agreement
between the government of Sierra Leone and the U.N. under Security
Council Resolution 1315 (2000), and not pursuant to Chapter VII of the
U.N. Charter.17 The agreement determines, inter alia, the competence,
jurisdiction, and organizational structure of the Special Court. No reference
is made in either the agreement or the statute to Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter. Article 1 of the agreement merely states: "There is hereby established
a Special Court for Sierra Leone..." and the statute traces its authority to an
agreement between the government of Sierra Leone and the U.N. "pursuant
to Security Council Resolution 1315 (2000)."18
In a number of other resolutions on Sierra Leone, the Security Council
explicitly stated that it was acting pursuant to Chapter VII, 19 but it failed to
do so in Resolution 1315.20 Although Resolution 1315 used the same
terminology found in Chapter VII, reiterating "that the situation in Sierra
Leone continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in
the region,"21 neither the statute nor the agreement explicitly states that the
proposed court was established pursuant to this Chapter. Without such
explicit reference, it seems clear that the Security Council was not
exercising its powers under Chapter VII.
17. Special Court Statute, supra note 13.
18. Special Court Statute, supra note 13, art. 1.
19. S.C. Res. 1343, U.N. SCOR, 4287th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1343 (2001) (imposing
sanctions on Liberia for its support for the RUF and its involvement in the illicit arms-for-
diamonds trade); S.C. Res. 1306, U.N. SCOR, 4168th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1306 (2000)
(prohibiting the direct or indirect import of all rough diamonds from Sierra Leone); S.C. Res.
1171, U.N. SCOR, 3889th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1171 (1998) (terminating sanctions imposed
on the military junta); S.C. Res. 1132, U.N. SCOR, 3822nd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1132 (1997)
(demanding that the military junta take immediate steps to relinquish power in Sierra Leone
and make way for the restoration of the democratically-elected Government and a return to
constitutional order).
20. There are numerous references in United Nations documents categorically stating
that the Court was not established pursuant to Chapter VII. The Secretary-General of the U.N.
in his Report on the establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone endorsed the view
that the Court was not established pursuant to the Chapter VII of the Charter and noted that
"the Security Council may wish to consider endowing it with Chapter VII powers for the
specific purpose of requesting the surrender of an accused from outside the jurisdiction of the
Court." Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra
Leone, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (2000). The statements by U.N. officials
constitute a part of the travaux preparatoire of the Special Court Agreement and will be used by
the Courts when interpreting the Statute and the Agreement.
21. Security Council Resolution 1315. supra note 12.
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Unlike the Special Court, the TRC is a national institution. The legal
basis of the TRC is in Sierra Leonean law.22 The Commission was first
proposed under the Lom& Peace Accord signed between the government of
Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front in 1999. Unlike the
agreement with the Secretary-General establishing the Special Court, the
Loms Accord is not an international agreement, but a compact between
two national parties -the government of Sierra Leone and the RUF. The
U.N., Organisation of African Unity, Economic Community of West
African States and Jesse Jackson, U.S. Presidential Special Envoy for the
Promotion of Democracy in Africa, signed the agreement as witnesses
and/or moral guarantors, but not as parties.23 Cementing the obligations
assumed through the signing of the Lom6 Peace Accord, the Parliament of
Sierra Leone passed the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act (TRC
Act) in 2000,24 specifying the scope, mandate, and jurisdiction of the
Commission.
B. Composition
The Special Court will be composed of one or more trial chambers, an
appeals chamber, the prosecutor's office and the registry. 25 Three judges
serve in the trial chambers-two appointed by the U.N. Secretary-General
and one by the government of Sierra Leone. 26 Six months after the Court
commences its functions, a second trial chamber may be set up if requested
by the Secretary-General, the prosecutor, or the president of the Special
Court.27 In the appellate chambers, three judges were appointed by the
Secretary-General and two by the government of Sierra Leone.28
The decision to create a mixed tribunal of national and international
judges was due primarily to practical considerations and fears about the
neutrality of national trials. The Sierra Leonean judicial system has been
largely decimated as a result of the war. It is only functional in Freetown
and lacks the enormous human and financial resources required to
undertake post-conflict trials.29 Resolution 1315 particularly noted "the
negative impact of the security situation on the administration of justice in
22. See The Truth and Reconciliation Act, sec. 2(1) (2000) (Sierra Leone) [hereinafter TRC
Act], available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/trcact2OOO.html ("There is hereby established a
body known as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.")
23. Lomi Accord, supra note 7.
24. TRC Act, supra note 22.
25. Special Court Statute, supra note 13, app. I, art. 11.
26. Id. art. 12(1)(a).
27.Id. art. 2(1). (As amended by letter from the President of the Security Council.
December 22, 2000 Security Council Letter, supra note 14.)
28. Id. art. 12(1)(b).
29. For the effect of the war on the Sierra Leone judiciary, see The Commonwealth
Human Rights Initiative, In Pursuit of Justice: A Report on the Judiciary in Sierra Leone
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Sierra Leone and the pressing need for international cooperation to assist in
strengthening the judicial system of Sierra Leone." 30
Like the Special Court, the TRC is also of mixed composition. The Act
provides for seven commissioners: four citizens of Sierra Leone and three
non-citizens.31 The President of Sierra Leone appoints all the
commissioners as well as the chairman and deputy chairman of the
Commission.32 The decision to include international members was made to
ensure that the Commission creates an impartial historical record of the
events in Sierra Leone.
C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The Sierra Leone Parliament passed the TRC Act in February 2000. 33
The broad functions of the Commission, as stated in Section 6(1) are: (i) to
create an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human
rights and international humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in
Sierra Leone, from the beginning.of the conflict in 1991 to the signing of the
Lom6 Peace Agreement in 1996; (ii) to address impunity; (iii) to respond to
the needs of the victims; (iv) to promote healing and reconciliation; and (v)
to prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered.
The Commission's mandate embraces investigating and reporting on
the causes, nature and extent of the violations and abuses to the fullest
degree possible -including their antecedents, their context, the role of both
internal and external factors in the conflict, and whether the abuses were
the result of a deliberate policy or authorization by any government,
group, or individual.34
The Commission's task will also include helping to restore human
dignity to victims and promoting reconciliation by providing victims the
opportunity to give an account of the violations and abuses suffered, and
providing perpetrators the chance to relate their experiences. Its goal is to
create a climate that fosters constructive interchange between victims and
perpetrators, giving special attention to the subject of sexual abuse and to
the experiences of children who participated in the conflict.35
The Commission's subject matter jurisdiction overlaps with the Special
Court's but is much broader. The Special Court's jurisdiction is limited to
serious violations of international humanitarian law and crimes under
Sierra Leonean law, whereas the Commission can investigate all or any
abuses and violations of human rights and international humanitarian law
30. Security Council Resolution 1315, supra note 12.
31. TRC Act, supra note 22, § 3(1).
32. Id. § 3(3).
33. Id. § 6.
34. Id. § 6(2)(a).
35. Id. § 6(2)(b).
[Vol. 6
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related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone.36 Pre-conceived notions of the
conflict will not limit the Commission's scope.
In contrast, Resolution 1315 limits the subject matter jurisdiction of the
Court,37 particularly with respect to crimes under international law, and
depends upon documented accounts of the war as well as predetermined
ideas about the nature of the conflict and the acts committed during it. The
Special Court's subject matter jurisdiction includes violations of
humanitarian law. International humanitarian law prohibits crimes
against humanity, 38 violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocol 11,39 and acts prohibited under
customary international law at the time they were committed. 40 Crimes
under Sierra Leonean law subject to the jurisdiction of the Special Court
include offenses relating to the abuse of girls under the Prevention of
Cruelty to Children Act of 196041 and offenses relating to the wanton
destruction of property under the Malicious Damage Act of 1861.42
D. Personal Jurisdiction
The Court has jurisdiction to try "persons who bear the greatest
responsibility" for serious violations of international humanitarian law and
Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since
36. Special Court Statute, supra note 13, art. 1.
37. Security Council Resolution 1315, supra note 12.
38. Article 2 of the Special Court Statute gives the Court power to prosecute persons who
committed murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape,
sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and any other form of sexual violence,
persecution on political, racial, ethnic and religious grounds and other inhumane acts as part
of a widespread or systematic attack against civilian population. Special Court Statute, supra
note 13, art. 2.
39. Article 3 of the Special Court Statute gives the Court power to prosecute persons who
committed or ordered the commission of serious violations under Article 3 common to the
Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 for the protection of War Victims and of Additional
Protocol H thereto of June 8, 1977. These violations include violence to life, health and physical
or mental well-being of persons, particularly murder; cruel treatment such as torture,
mutilation, or any other form of corporal punishment; collective punishments; taking of
hostages; acts of terrorism; outrages upon personal dignity; pillage; the passing of sentences
and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly
constituted court and threats to commit any of these acts. Special Court Statute, supra note 13,
art. 3.
40. Article 4 of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone lists these as including:
intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population or against individual civilians
not taking part in hostilities; intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations,
material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the
protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict.
Special Court Statute, supra note 13, art. 3. The original Article 4(c) was amended to read:
"Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into armed forces or groups or
using them to participate actively in hostilities." December 22, 2000 Security Council Letter,
supra note 14
41. Special Court Statute, supra note 13, art.5(a).
42. Id.
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November 30, 1996.43 The U.N. Secretary-General has cautioned that the
term "persons who bear greatest responsibility" does not limit personal
jurisdiction to political and military leaders and is meant to provide a
prosecutorial strategy rather than to form an element of the crime that
must be proven:
[T]he determination of the meaning of the term "persons who
bear the greatest responsibility" in any given case falls initially to
the Prosecutor and the Special Court itself .... [P]articular mention
is made of those leaders who, in committing such crimes, have
threatened the establishment and implementation of the peace
process in Sierra Leone. It is my understanding that following
from paragraph 2 above, the words "those leaders who....
threaten the establishment and implementation of the peace
process" do not describe an element of the crime but rather
provide guidance to the prosecutor in determining his or her
prosecutorial strategy. Consequently, the commission of any of
the statutory crimes without necessarily threatening the
establishment and implementation of the peace process would not
detract from the international criminal responsibility otherwise
entailed for the accused. 4
Whereas the prosecutor in the Special Court will seek to try those who
bear the greatest responsibility, the Commission has no such restriction.
The government of Sierra Leone has noted that whereas "the Special Court
[is] for the few who meet the personal jurisdiction requirements, the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission [is] for everybody else." 45 Given the
limited resources of the Special Court, it will only be able to prosecute a
relatively limited number of persons, despite the length of the conflict and
the large number of forces involved. The most optimistic estimates indicate
that the Court may eventually try 24 persons.46 The Commission will
almost certainly investigate more people than that.
Since the overlapping personal jurisdiction of the Special Court and the
TRC is a potential source of conflict, the U.N. Expert group suggested that
43. Special Court Statute as amended by letter from the President of Security Council.
Dec. 22, 2000 Security Council Letter, supra note 14.
44. Jan. 12, 2001 S-G Letter, supra note 14, 2-3.
45. Relationship between the Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission: Legal Analysis and Policy Considerations of the Government of Sierra Leone
for the Task Force (Jan. 7-18, 2002) [hereinafter, Briefing Paper on the Relationship between
the Special Court and Truth and Reconciliation Commission] available at
http://www.specialcourt.org/documents/PlanningMission/BriefingPapers/TRC -SpCt.html.
46. Neither the United Nations, the Government or Court officials have confirmed or
denied this figure. However, the Deputy Registrar of the Court, Robert Kirkwood, was quoted
on Sierra Leone Web as stating that the new court building will have 26 cells and that all of
the accused will be held in individual cells built in accordance with international standards.
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the prosecutor should define in his publicly announced prosecutorial
strategy "those who bear the greatest responsibility." Once defined, such
defendants should be considered within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Court and outside that of the Commission.
47
This solution to the personal jurisdiction conflict may not be entirely
acceptable as there is nothing in the current law that restricts the TRC from
taking evidence from or investigating the actors "who bear the greatest
responsibility" and who appear before the Court. Denying the TRC
jurisdiction over such individuals would mean denying it access to the
leaders of the conflict, and without access to that evidence, the Commission
would be unable to fulfill its mandate "to create an impartial historical
record of violations and abuses."
E. Temporal Jurisdiction
The Special Court's jurisdiction covers events after November 30,
1996.48 This date was meant to put the Sierra Leone conflict in perspective
without unnecessarily extending the Special Court's temporal jurisdiction.
The Special Court currently has an open-ended mandate: its lifespan will
be determined by a subsequent agreement between the government of
Sierra Leone and the U.N. This may happen when the judicial activities are
completed, when local courts in Sierra Leone have acquired the capacity to
assume prosecution of the remaining cases, or when resources become
unavailable.
49
The commencement date for the Court's temporal jurisdiction is most
unsatisfactory. The war in Sierra Leone began on March 23, 1991. Because
of the Court's truncated temporal jurisdiction, the massive violations of
human rights and humanitarian law that were committed by all the parties
to the conflict between March 23, 1991 and November 30, 1996 will remain
unpunished.
5 0
Before determining the temporal jurisdiction of the Court, the
Secretary-General considered and eliminated several other potential
starting dates. The date of commencement of the conflict, March 23, 1991,
was ruled out because of the onerous burden in terms of the time and cost
of undertaking investigations extending this far back in time. The date of
the AFRC coup, May 25, 1997, was rejected as having too many political
overtones, and January 6, 1999, the date of the rebel invasion of the capital,
was rejected as giving the impression of favoring Freetown over the
provinces.51 The November 30, 1996 date thus represents a compromise.
47. Coraunique issued by the United Nations Expert Meeting on the Relationship
Between the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court for Sierra Leone,
New York, Dec. 20-22, 2001.
48. Special Court Statute, supra note 13, art. 1.
49. Special Court Statute supra note 13, 28.
50. For a critique of the temporal jurisdiction of the Court, see Tejan-Cole, supra note 9.
51. Special Court Statute, supra note 13, 26-27.
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By contrast, the Commission's temporal jurisdiction is more
satisfactory. Its jurisdiction extends to the conflict's origins, March 23, 1991,
and concludes with the signing of the Lom6 Peace Agreement on July 7,
1999. Two key points should be noted. First, the temporal jurisdiction of
the two institutions overlaps between November 30, 1996 and July 7, 1999.
Second, although the Commission's temporal jurisdiction begins in May of
1991, it will not be limited by this time frame in the course of establishing
an impartial record. Thus, it must delve beyond the commencement date
when determining the underlying causes of the war.
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
COMMISSION AND THE SPECIAL COURT
A. The Need to Determine the Relationship
From the examination of the mandate and jurisdiction of both
institutions, it is clear that their work overlaps. Both have related functions
and the same common goals: ensuring accountability in Sierra Leone,
bringing sustainable peace to the country, and building a culture of respect
for human rights. Without a clearly defined relationship, the danger exists
that the institutions may duplicate each other's work, thereby wasting their
limited resources.
Another problem is that, because of the lack of a well-defined
relationship between the two institutions,. Sierra Leoneans are confused
about the respective roles the institutions are supposed to play. In addition
to clarifying perceptions on the ground, clearly defining this relationship
may also help reduce the tension and rivalry that usually exists between
such institutions. Both institutions will lose credibility if they are seen to be
in conflict. Thus, it is of critical importance that this issue be resolved.
B. The Statutes
The Loms Peace Accord Act 52 and the TRC Act,53 which established the
TRC, make no reference to the Special Court. At the time the TRC Act was
enacted, four months before the president's requests to the U.N., the
Special Court had not been contemplated. Similarly, the agreement
between the government of Sierra Leone and the Secretary-General of the
U.N. establishing the Special Court makes no direct reference to the TRC.54
52. Lom6 Accord, supra note 7.
53. TRC Act, supra note 22.
54. There is one indirect reference to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in the
Special Court Statute. Under the title "The Prosecutor," Article 15(5) provides: "In the
prosecution of juvenile offenders, the prosecutor shall ensure that the child-rehabilitation
program is not placed at risk and that, where appropriate, resort should be had to alternative
truth and reconciliation mechanisms, to the extent of their availability." Special Court Statute,
supra note 13., art. 15(5).
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The statutes remain silent on the relationship between the two entities,
suggesting that they are separate and distinct. Even the drafters of the
Special Court statute and agreement, which came later and had an
opportunity to address the issue, either did not envision any relationship
between the institutions or simply deemed the issue unnecessary of
examination.
C. The Question of Primacy and the Relationship to National Courts
Although the TRC Act does not explicitly delineate the relationship
between the Commission and either domestic courts or the Special Court,
reference is made to domestic courts. Section 8(2) provides that failure to
respond to a summons or subpoena issue by the Commission, failure to
truly and faithfully answer questions of the Commission after responding
to a summons or subpoena, or intentionally providing misleading or false
information to the Commission will be deemed a contempt of court and
that the Commission can, at its discretion, refer the matter to the High
Court of Sierra Leone for trial and punishment. Similarly, other offenses
created under the Act will be enforced by the High Court, a national court
of Sierra Leone. For example, under section 9 (2) of the Act, if a person
willfully obstructs or interferes with the Commission or any of its members
or officers in the discharge of their functions, s/he will be charged, tried
and, if convicted, punished by the High Court of Sierra Leone.
Unlike the Special Court, despite having some international
Commissioners, the TRC is a national institution, and, as such, it does not
have primacy over national courts. The Constitution of Sierra Leone
provides that the Supreme Court is the highest court and the final court of
appeal.55 Section 125 of the Constitution states that "[t]he Supreme Court
shall have supervisory jurisdiction over all other Courts in Sierra Leone
and over any adjudicating authority."5 6 Consequently, the Supreme Court
will have supervisory jurisdiction over the Commission.
57
None of the statutes gives the TRC primacy over the Special Court. On
the other hand, the statute of the .Special Court gives it primacy over
national courts. The Court may at any stage formally request a national
court to defer to its competence in accordance with its statute and rules of
procedureSS The TRC does not fall under the definition of national court
and will be unaffected by this provision in the Special Court's statute. The
Commission has functions akin to a court such as issuing subpoenas but it
55. SIERRA LEONE CONST. (Act No. 6 of 1991) sec. 122, available at http://www.sierra-
leone.org/constitution-vii.html.
56. SIERRA LEONE CONST. (Act No. 6 of 1991) sec. 125, available at http://www.sierra-
leone.org/constitution-vii.html
57. This jurisdiction is not limited to the Supreme Court; all other courts that are part of
the Superior Courts of Judicature also have supervisory jurisdiction over the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission.
58. Statute of the Special Court, supra note 13, art. 8(2).
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is certainly not a national court, and the Special Court does not have
primacy over it.
Subsequent to the signing of the statute, however, the government of
Sierra Leone enacted the Special Court Agreement 2002 (Ratification) Act
of 2002.59 This enabling legislation provides "for the ratification and
implementation of the Agreement between the Government of Sierra
Leone and the United Nations signed on 16th January 2002, for the
establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone." 60 Section 21 (2) of the
Act requires that "[n]otwithstanding any other law, every natural person,
corporation, or other body created by or under Sierra Leone law shall
comply with any direction specified in an order of the Special Court."61
In a letter to the Attorney-General sent before the bill became law,
Campaign for Good Governance (CGG), a national non-governmental
organization, noted that " [i]t would seem from this bill that the consensus
forged with regards to parity between the two institutions has not been
officially recognized by any of the key decision-makers." 62 It requested that
the government review the bill so as to ensure that "the Act should in no
way grant the Special Court primacy over the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, particularly with regards to demanding confidential
information." Such a move, they warned, "would decimate any impression
of Truth and Reconciliation Commission independence and demote it to a
mere research arm of the Special Court." 63 CGG's request fell on deaf ears.
Consequently, since both institutions came into existence, the questions
of primacy and of the relationship between these institutions and the
national courts have dominated the national debate. It is clear that the
Special Court will have primacy over persons who bear the greatest
responsibility for the crimes listed in its statute. What is uncertain is
whether the TRC is obliged to comply with orders of the Special Court.
The Special Court's enabling legislation allows it to direct or order the
TRC to do or omit to do a particular act. It may request and demand
evidence from the Commission, whether the evidence is confidential or
not. In stark contrast, Section 14(1) of the TRC Act makes the Commission
an independent institution "in the performance of its functions under this
Act, not.. .subject to the direction or control of any person or authority." 64
Both institutions are seeking to avoid a confrontation. In the event that
a conflict arises, however, the courts of Sierra Leone may have to determine
59. The Special Court Agreement 2002 (Ratification) Act (2002) [hereinafter Ratification
Act], available at http:/ / www.specialcourt.org/ documents/ SpecialCourtAct.html.
60. Id., Memorandum of Object and Reasons.
61. Id., art. 21(2).
62. Letter from Abdul Tejan-Cole, Acting Coordinator, The Campaign for Good
Governance, to Solomon E. Berewa, Attorney General and Minister of Justice of Sierra Leone
(Mar. 15, 2002) (on file with the author and available at http://www.slcgg.org/letterag.htm).
The Campaign for Good Governance is a national nongovernmental organization in Sierra
Leone. See www.slcgg.org.
63. Id.
64. TRC Act, supra note 22, art. 14(1).
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whether one institution has primacy over the other. The doctrine of
subsequent legislation supports the Special Court's primacy over the
TRC.65 Under this doctrine, if provisions of 'an earlier bill are inconsistent
with those of a later bill, they are impliedly repealed. Since the local
enabling legislation giving the TRC its independence was enacted in
February 2000, and the Special Court Agreement (Ratification) Act was
passed in 2002, the latter will arguably take precedence.
The Special Court Agreement (Ratification) Act, however, aimed at
giving effect to the signed statute and agreement. The agreement and
statute do not expressly give the Special Court powers to direct the TRC.
The government of Sierra Leone has argued that domestic law should bend
to international law and that the Act must be limited by the terms of the
agreement:
It should also be remembered in this respect that the Agreement
for the Special Court is a legally binding international agreement
that cannot be circumvented by either pre-existing or
subsequently enacted national law. Rather, should there be a
conflict, domestic law has to be altered in order to comply with
Sierra Leone's international obligations. Sierra Leone is therefore
compelled to ensure that the necessary domestic legal conditions
exist to enable it to fulfil this obligation as set out in the
Agreement.
66
The statute, which the enabling act seeks to give effect to, only gives the
Special Court primacy over national courts, and the TRC is certainly not a
national court. The government of Sierra Leone has also noted that Article
17 of the agreement governs obedience of national institutions to the
Special Court and "requires complete compliance." Article 17 sets out
Sierra Leone's obligation to cooperate with all the organs of the Court,
including facilitating access to the prosecutor to sites, persons and relevant
documents required for the investigation.67 Article 17 is silent on the scope
of this obligation, however. While the agreement stresses co-operation, the
enabling legislation emphasizes direction. The latter is obligatory, and the
former is voluntary. The two characterizations of the relationship cannot be
reconciled.
D. Information Sharing
65. Also known as the doctrine of implied repeal, leges posteriores priores contrarias
abrogant, states that an earlier act cannot be used to amend or repeal a later act. Instead, where
any conflict arises between acts of Parliament that cannot be smoothed by judicial
interpretation, the later act always takes precedence.
66. Briefing Paper on Relationship between the Special Court and the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, supra note 45.
67. Ratification Act, supra note 59, art. 17.
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The question of information sharing was one of the most imperative
issues that dominated the initial debate about the relationship between the
two institutions. 68 The issue was raised not only as a matter of academic
debate but also as one of the most frequent questions asked at workshops
in Freetown. At a preliminary sensitization session conducted by Post-
Conflict Reintegration Initiative for Development and Empowerment
(PRIDE) in Freetown in October 2001, ex-combatants made it clear that
their willingness to participate in the TRC would depend in part on the
relationship between the Commission and the Special Court.69 The
consensus was that perpetrators would be less willing to attend the
Commission, or less inclined to tell the truth, if they believed that their
evidence would be used against them in the Special Court.
From the outset, the Commission has been adamant that it would not
share any confidential information with the Special Court. The TRC Act
empowers the Commission to take evidence on a confidential basis. It
further provides that the Commission will not be compelled to disclose any
such information given to it in confidence. 70 Although the Commission is
competent to disclose confidential information, it may not be compelled to
do so under the Act. For instance, the Commission cannot be subpoenaed
to produce its own evidence to the Court.71
Prosecutorial strategy may resolve some of the confusion. Special
Court Prosecutor David Crane has stated that the Prosecutor's Office will
not seek to use testimony taken by the TRC.72 Crane also has said that the
68. The Attorney General of Sierra Leone has stated that the issue of information control
has often been confused with the issue of primacy. However, the Attorney General notes that:
Primacy refers solely to the question of which court has jurisdiction over a
particular case or individual. As such, it only applies in respect of Sierra Leonean
Courts and only in the limited situation where one body either is or could be
seized of jurisdiction in a particular matter. Primacy is legally and conceptually
different from the issue of information sharing or compliance with orders of the
Court. Thus the fact that the Special Court has primacy over Sierra Leone courts is
separate from the question of whether a national institution is required to comply
with orders of the Special Court: this is governed solely by article 17 of the
Agreement, which requires complete compliance.
Briefing Paper on Relationship between the Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, supra note 45.
69. POST-CONFLICT REINTEGRATION INITIATIVE FOR DEVELOPMENT AND EMPOWERMENT &
THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, EX-COMBATANT VIEWS OF THE TRUTH
AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION AND THE SPECIAL COURT IN SIERRA LEONE 19 (Sept. 12,
2002) available at http://www.ictj.org/downloads/PRIDE%20report.pdf. However, at the
press conference launching the report, PRIDE Executive Secretary Joe Patrick Amara said that
although the possibility of the Special Court using information from the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission is a concern of some ex-combatants, 63% of those surveyed
expressed a willingness to testify before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, even if the
information could be used by the Special Court.
70. TRC Act, supra note 22, § 7(3). The Act does not prohibit the sharing of information
disclosed in public.
71. If the subsequent Ratification Act is deemed to have repealed this provision then the
Special Court has the authority to demand any information from the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission. See note 65 supra.
72. SIERRA LEONE WEB NEWS ARCHIVES. fec. . 0 h10.p:/ /nni -
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Court and the TRC will operate separately, but that both institutions will
work to address "the entrenched problem of impunity" and to ensure
accountability. 73 The matter seems to have been resolved between the
Office of the Prosecutor and the TRC. There is the likelihood, however, that
if the Commission is in possession of confidential exculpatory evidence, the
defense may request access to such information.
This scenario may not be very worrisome for the Commission. A
perpetrator will not be afraid to make statements if he is aware that the
only circumstance in which his statement will be used is to secure his own
acquittal or the acquittal of another perpetrator. Giving the defense limited
access to confidential information from the Commission will address some
fears and concerns and reduce the risk of the institutions undermining each
other's work. A distinction must be drawn, however, between gaining
access to confidential information and using such information as evidence
in a court of law. This access must be very limited in order to ensure that
the Commission is not seen as another chamber of the Court.
In addition, the defense must not be given free access to all information
in possession of the Commission. Information should be given based on
three preconditions: the information requested must be specific, it must be
essential to a fair determination of the innocence of the accused, and it
must not be reasonably obtainable from any other source.
This approach was endorsed in the government's briefing paper on the
relationship between the two institutions. The briefing paper suggests that
the TRC should share with the Special Court "confidential" material
provided to it solely when the information can only be obtained from the
TRC, and the information is "essential for the conviction or acquittal of the
accused." 74 This approach would preserve the confidentiality of most
materials while allowing the Special Court to trump that confidentiality in
order to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
The question then arises who determines whether these preconditions
have been met. It would certainly be undesirable for the institutions to use
their enforcement powers against each other. Such matters should be
resolved on a cooperative basis when practical.
E. Sharing Resources
The TRC and the Special Court have a common problem - lack of
funding. Cooperating in three areas could make maximal use of these
limited resources to improve accountability in Sierra Leone: investigation,
disseminating public information, and witness protection.
leone.org/slnews1202.html.
73. Id.
74. Briefing Paper on Relationship between the Special Court and the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, supra note 45.
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The Special Court has sufficient resources for 18 months, but the
Secretary-General has warned that, as its funding is entirely voluntary, this
will "not provide the assured and continuous source of funding which
would be required.... ,75 In 2001, a revised budget was presented to
Member States, putting the costs of the first three years of operation at $57
million, with $16.8 million reserved for the first year.76 While the majority
of funds for the first year have been deposited into the Court's trust fund
and pledges for the following twenty-four months have been made, there is
still a significant gap between amounts pledged and the money collected. 77
It is uncertain whether these pledges will be honored.
At the same time, the T R C is in financial dire straits. It has struggled
to secure even a fraction of its necessary operating budget. In an interview
given to Sierra Leone Web, the interim Executive Secretary of the
Commission stated that the Commission was operating with a two person
skeletal staff.78 Commissioner William Schabas also drew attention to the
Commission's critical funding situation. To date, pledges amount to
$1,580,739, of which $1,107,825 has been received. 79 Although the
Government of Sierra Leone has also donated the sum of $97,000 and
contributed the site for the Commission, the Commission has been unable
to obtain one-fifth of its estimated budget. With attention now focused on
the war on terror, the Commission is unlikely to receive any significant
additional funding.
This shortage of funds means that the institutions must strive to work
together, out of necessity if nothing else. The government of Sierra Leone
has endorsed this view and identified two-main areas of in which critical
resources might be beneficially shared, viz., training of investigators,
interviewers and other staff members, and public information and
education.
80
The Government noted that it is crucial to the enterprise of both the
Commission and the Court that investigators and interviewers be properly
trained as they will frequently be required to explain the mechanisms to
participants and answer questions and often will be the first people to
whom witnesses tell their stories. Therefore, investigators and interviewers
75. Special Court Statute, supra note 22.
76. July 12, 2001 S-G Letter, supra note 14 (referring to an amended budget and a letter on
June 14, 2001 from the Secretariat to Member States regarding revised budget estimates)
These numbers include contributions received up until July 6, 2001.
77. The shortfalls amount to approximately $1.8 million for the first year and $19.6
million for the second and third years combined.
78. SIERRA LEONE WEB NEWS ARCHIVES, Oct. 14, 2002, available at http://www.sierra-
leone.org/sInews1002.html.
79. Eighth Weekly Briefing of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Chaired by
Professor William Schabas, on Wednesday Sept. 11, 2002, available at http://www.sierra-
leone.org/trcbriefing091102.html.
80. Briefing Paper on Relationship between the Special Court and the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission., supra note 45.
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should be "properly trained both to facilitate the gathering of information
as well as to make the process as beneficial as possible for the witness."
81
The underlying objectives of the public information campaigns for the
Commission and the Special Court should be: (i) to dispel fear,
confusion and misinformation because they are disruptive to the peace
process; (ii) to build confidence in the institutions through emphasizing
their independence and credibility; and (iii) to encourage the public's
effective participation in and support of the Commission and Court.
The two institutions should commit themselves to a public information
policy of "do no harm" and together espouse the independence and
distinctiveness of the Commission and the Special Court.
The collaborative aspects of the public information strategy of both
institutions could include joint and shared training to ensure that those
working on the information strategy are familiar with each other's role.
The two bodies should also commit to sharing public informational
material for pre-release consideration by the other body. This will serve as
a useful means of exchanging information and ensuring that the
independence, credibility and efficiency of one body is not affected by a
conflicting publication associated with the other.
A joint public information strategy for the TRC and the Court should
emphasize that the Court will prosecute a limited number of perpetrators
"who bear the greatest responsibility" for atrocities, while the TRC will
process all violations from 1991 until 1999. It should also indicate that
proactive and full co-operation by a perpetrator with the Commission
would be considered favorably by the Prosecutor as he develops his short
list of possible candidates for indictment, as well as during the sentencing
phase.
The Commission and Special Court should also coordinate their
methodologies on evidence gathering. For example, to the extent the
Commission investigates a particular site or is provided with materials,
it will be important to ensure that its investigators do not in any way
disturb or taint evidence that the Court might need, or break a chain of
custody that the Court might need to prove. If both the Commission and
Court conduct the same investigations it will save resources, financial as
well as human. There are very few qualified forensic experts within
Freetown. Because bringing in two teams from abroad to do the same
investigation would be very costly, experts will need to work together.
Another possible area for cooperation is the provision of protection
services to victims and witnesses. This includes ensuring the safety and
security of all witnesses brought before the relevant accountability
mechanisms, which involves dealing with highly confidential information;
linking national and local authorities; and ensuring safe transfer,
accommodation and, if necessary, the relocation of witnesses. Protective
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the Commission or the Special Court but also for potential witnesses. A.
perception that adequate protection may not be available will deter people
from deciding to testify before either body in the first place.
The question facing Sierra Leone is not only what kind of protective
measures should be adopted, but also whether the Commission and the
Special Court should adopt a joint structure within which to provide those
measures. If there is any sharing of information between the Special Court
and TRC, meetings between the two istitutions will be needed to ensure
that sharing of information does not inadvertently result in a person failing
to be covered by witness protection.
Close cooperation could blur the distinction between the institutions,
however, and risk seriously damaging the independence of the institutions
in the public eye. The perception that both institutions are the same when
created may be difficult to erase. If the investigators of the Commission
and the Court work too closely together, then people who would otherwise
have cooperated with the Commission, b u t not with the Court, will find
excuse not to do even that. They may see the Commission as another
chamber of the Court.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission have
the capacity to contribute dramatically to the stability and longevity of
peace, justice and democracy in Sierra Leone. However, if they are poorly
designed or lose support from civil society and the legal community, the
impact could be minimal or even negative. They face a difficult dilemma -
each must function and appear to the public as distinct, independent
entities while simultaneously seeking common goals: ensuring
accountability for human rights violations in Sierra Leone, bringing
sustainable peace, and building a culture of respect for human rights.
In order to be successful and avoid structural conflict, the relationship
between the Commission and the Court should take account of the
cultural, social and other contexts within which the institutions must
operate. Enabling the people of Sierra Leone to have input into the
establishment and operation of accountability mechanisms in their country
would help ensure their cooperation.
The Special Court should set as a fundamental substantive and
methodological priority to work together, co-operatively, with national
institutions, including the Commission. The Court should not use its legal
powers to impose its will. It should do everything it can to make national
institutions effective in the short term and strong and self-sufficient in the
longer term.
By developing a cooperative relationship that reduces or even removes
the need for the Special Court to exercise its coercive powers, each
institution will be better placed to serve the accountability process and
contribute to a sustained peace in Sierra Leone. Furthermore, a proper
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explanation of these issues to the people of Sierra Leone can itself
contribute to the accountability process and go a long way to reducing the
confusion and distrust generated by misinformation that has already been
widely disseminated regarding the respective roles and powers of the two
institutions.
21
Tejan-Cole: The Complementary and Conflicting Relationship Between the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2003
22
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 6 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol6/iss1/5
